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CORRUPTION AND THE SHADOW ECONOMY
Abstract
This paper develops a simple framework to analyze the links between
corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official
economy.  In a model of self-selection with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we
show that the entrepreneurs’ option to flee to the underground economy
constrains a corrupt official’s ability to introduce distortions to the economy
for private gains.  The unofficial economy thus mitigates government-induced
distortions and, as a result, leads to enhanced economic activities in the
official sector.  In this sense, the presence of the unofficial sector acts as a
complement to the official economy rather than a substitute. 
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The importance of the shadow economy has been well documented, especially for many
developing countries and economies in transition where legal and political institutions are not
adequate to support efficient market activities [see de Soto (1989)].
1  By definition, the
unofficial economy constitutes activities that are not recorded in the government statistics.  As
such, the extent of the unofficial economy in a given country is hard to measure precisely.
Nonetheless, many scholars have attempted to indirectly estimate the share of the unofficial
economy in GDP and have come up with a significant size of the shadow economy [see
Schneider and Enste (2000) for an excellent survey on this issue].  For instance, according to
Schneider and Enste’s estimates based on the physical input (electricity) and currency
demand, the underground sector in Nigeria, Egypt, and Thailand represents in each case
nearly three-quarters the size of officially recorded GDP as averaged over 1990-93.
2  The
corresponding figures for OECD countries range from 8 to 30 percent.
Despite universal recognition for the importance of the unofficial economy, its role in
terms of allocation of resources and market performance is less well understood and entails
considerable disagreement.   As emphasized by Schneider and Enste (2000), the size, causes,
and consequences of the shadow economy vary for different types of countries.  In this paper,
we analyze the role of the unofficial economy in a specific situation where entrepreneurs are
required to purchase a license from a corrupt official to open a shop in the official economy,
as in Shleifer and Vishny [1993]. We consider such a situation as an environment for studying
the unofficial economy because one of the main reasons for the very existence of the
unofficial sector is entrepreneurs’ attempts to find a shelter from government-induced
distortions such as excessive taxes, regulation, and graft.
3  In such a framework, we ask the
                                                     
1 Shadow economy has also been called the underground economy, unofficial economy, hidden economy or
informal economy.  We will use all these terms interchangeably. 
2 Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), by proxying the overall economic activity with electricity consumption, also
report the following figures for transition economies as shares of unofficial activity in total activity for 1989:
Bulgaria, 22.8 percent; Czech Republic and Slovakia, 6.0 percent; Hungary, 27.0 percent; Poland 15.7 percent;
Romania 22.3 percent; the former Soviet republics, 12.0 percent.  Another estimate by 1996 Russia’s Central
Statistical Office, Goskomstat, indicates that the unofficial economy is about 20 percent of total activity; see
Johnson, Kaufman and Shleifer (1997).
3 Friedman et al. (1999) argue that entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the
burden of bureaucracy and corruption.  They draw this conclusion in their cross-country analysis that higher tax
rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP.   High correlation between corruption and3
question of whether the unofficial economy is a substitute or a complement to the official
economy.  In other words, we examine whether economic activities in the unofficial economy
crowd out or promote economic activities in the official sector when the government official
uses the official sector as the source for his/her private gains. 
We show that the entrepreneurs’ option to flee to the underground sector constrains the
corrupt official’s ability to introduce distortion to the economy for private gains.  The
unofficial economy thus mitigates government-induced distortions and, as a result, leads to
enhanced economic activities in the official sector.  In this sense, the presence of the
unofficial sector plays as a complement to the official economy rather than a substitute.
4
Levenson and Maloney (1996) also develop a model where the underground economy
arises endogenously due to self-selection of heterogeneous entrepreneurs.
5 Running a
business in the formal economy generates several benefits from publicly provided goods but
also creates fixed costs for the entrepreneurs as they have to comply with regulatory measures
(e.g. reporting requirements). Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their abilities to manage
their firms. Over time, entrepreneurs learn more about their abilities. Entrepreneurs typically
start their businesses in the informal sector to avoid the high compliance costs. Once a firm is
sufficiently large (because the entrepreneur is of high ability), the firm switches to the official
economy to benefit from the publicly provided goods that are complementary inputs in
production. Levenson and Maloney thus model the dynamic transition process between the
formal and informal sectors.
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) present a model of full employment where
the labor can be employed either in the official or unofficial sectors.  In this model, the
expansion of the informal sector always implies the contraction of the formal sector and vice
versa.  In our model, the extent of the total economic activities is endogeneously determined
                                                                                                                                                                     
underground economic activities has been well established in empirical research.  See Johnson, Kaufmann and
Zoido-Lobaton (1998).
4 Schneider and Enste (2000) point out that at least two thirds of the income earned in the shadow economy is
immediately spent in the official economy and thus can have a positive effect on the official economy.  The
mechanism through which the shadow economy has a positive effect on the official economy in our paper is thus
different from that in Schneider and Enste (2000).
5 See also Ahlin (2001) for a model of occupational choice with heterogeneous entrepreneurs in the context of
corruption.4
by government policies.  In contrast to Johnson et al., we show that the existence of the
shadow economy helps the expansion of the official sector.  In addition, our model has a
unique equilibrium whereas their model exhibits multiple equilibria due to increasing returns
to sector size and due to path-dependence in the equilibrium selection.
Elsewhere in Choi and Thum (1998, forthcoming), we adopt a similar framework to
analyze the dynamics of corruption, but we do not consider the possibility of the underground
economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 sets up the
basic model and shows how corruption and the shadow economy interact when entrepreneurs
have the option of operating in the shadow economy to avoid tax/regulatory burdens imposed
by the government. We characterize the pattern of self-selection by entrepreneurs and the
optimal monetary demand schedule for the official. In Section 3, we extend the basic model to
allow for an endogenous choice of the capital stock by entrepreneurs. As the detection
probability typically rises with the size of illegally operating firms, evasion into the shadow
economy comes at the cost of an inefficiently small capital stock. Section 4 considers the case
where the corrupt authority not only demands bribery payments but also provides useful
public goods for production. The existence of an unofficial sector creates inefficiently small
incentives for public good provision. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2. A Simple Model of Corruption and the Shadow Economy
Before analyzing more complex linkages between corruption and the shadow economy, we
first develop the simplest feasible model of an economy with corruption where firms have the
outside option of operating in the shadow economy.  There is a population of entrepreneurs
whose total number is normalized to unity.  Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their ability to
generate income.  Let v denote an entrepreneur’s gross earnings reflecting his abilities. The
distribution of abilities is given by the inverse cumulative distribution function F(v) with
continuous density  0 ) ( ' ≤ v F , that is, F(v) denotes the proportion of entrepreneurs who can
generate income more than v. 5
As in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), we consider the sale of government property (entry
permit) by government officials as the prototype of corruption activities.
6  This is in
accordance with Tanzi’s (1998) statement that “the most popular and simplest definition of
corruption is that it is the abuse of public power for private benefit.”
7  Thus, entrepreneurs are
required to make payments m to a corrupt government official as a licensee fee in order to
open a shop.  In addition, an entrepreneur who wants to start a business has to employ the
amount of capital k.  For the time being, we assume that the required capital for entry k is
fixed.
8  The official sets the price of the license m to maximize his (private) revenues from
licensing.  As the entrepreneur’s ability v is private information, the corrupt official cannot
price discriminate and charges a uniform license fee m.
9 From the entrepreneurs’ point of
view, the bribery payment is like an additional cost of entry to the market.  
Corruption without the Shadow Economy
As a benchmark case, we first consider a situation where the option to operate in the shadow
economy is not available, that is, the entrepreneurs’ only choice is whether to enter or not.
We normalize the entrepreneurs’ payoffs from not entering the market to zero.  Then,
entrepreneurs who can generate non-negative incomes enter the market with capital k and
make the bribery payment m to the corrupt official:  0 ≥ − − = π m k v OE .   Given the official’s
demands m for the license, the marginal type who is indifferent between entry and exit is
given by v=k+m.
The entry behavior of the entrepreneurs implies that the corrupt official maximizes his
revenue:
() m k F m m R
m
+ ⋅ = ) ( max .
                                                     
6 See Bardhan (1997) for an excellent survey on corruption.
7 As pointed out by Stigler (1971), “[t]he state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with
even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce.”  The state’s monopoly on coercion can lead to the abuse
of power when public officials have wide discretion and little accountability due to the lack of formal checks and
balances [World Bank (1997)]. 
8  In the next section, we endogenize the amount of capital that represents the scale of operation for each
entrepreneur.
9 In a dynamic model of corruption, the official may be able to price discriminate based on the entry decisions
made in the earlier period.  Elsewhere in Choi and Thum (forthcoming), we analyze such a model and show that
the official’s ex post incentive to price discriminate entails the ratchet effect in that entrepreneurs have the
incentive to delay entry into the market in order to receive a discount in the permit price later.  However, the
paper does not address the issue of the shadow economy.6
Since the official’s demand schedule m is uniquely determined by v, we will find it more
convenient to treat v as the control variable:
) ( ) ( ) ( max v F k v v R
v
⋅ − = .
The marginal entrant  * v  that maximizes the corrupt official’s revenue is implicitly given by
the first order condition:
0 *) ( ' ) * ( *) ( = ⋅ − + v F k v v F .( 1 )
We make the standard assumption that the distribution of types satisfies the monotone hazard
rate condition, that is, -F´/F is increasing:
0 ) ' ( "
2 > + − F F F . (2)
This assumption ensures that the official’s objective function is quasi-concave and the second
order condition for the maximization problem is satisfied:
0 ) ( " ) ( ) ( '   2 < ⋅ − + ⋅ v F k v v F .
10 (3)
Then, the number of entrants is given by  *) (v F .  The official demands  k v m − = * * f o r  t h e
license.





x dF k x v W ) ( ) ( ) ( max .( 4 )
Thus, the marginal entrant that maximizes social welfare is 
FB v = k, that is, any entrepreneur
who can generate more revenue than the capital cost of k should enter the market.  When we
evaluate the first order condition for the official’s revenue maximization problem at
FB v = k, 
0 ) ( ) ( ' ) ( ) ( > = ⋅ − + k F v F k v v F
FB FB FB .
This implies that  * v  > 
FB v = k.  Corruption induces exit of the entrepreneurs whose types
belong to [
FB v = k, * v ) and hence reduces the number of entrants F(v*) below the first best
level ) ( ) ( k F v F
FB = .  Our simple model of corruption generates the standard result in the
                                                     
10Using the first order condition, we can rewrite the second order condition as
0 ) (   ' / ) ( ) ( " ) (   ' 2 < ⋅ − ⋅ v F v F v F v F .  The second order condition holds if the distribution F satisfies the
monotone hazard rate condition.   This condition is a standard assumption in the incentive literature and is
satisfied by most widely used distributions; see Fudenberg and Tirole [1991, p. 267].7
literature [see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) or Choi and Thum
(forthcoming)] that corruption is detrimental to welfare by reducing entry of firms.  The
deadweight loss due to corruption is given by − ∫ −
*
) ( ) (
v
k x dF k x .
Corruption with the Shadow Economy
Production in the official economy requires a license that is costly to entrepreneurs as corrupt
officials exercise their monopoly power. However, entrepreneurs do not only have the
decision of whether to make the bribery payment or stay out of business. They also have the
option to produce without a license in the unofficial or shadow economy.
11 This saves them
the costs of bribing the corrupt official but bears the cost of possible detection and subsequent
punishment.
Suppose that the probability of detection for an entrepreneur is µ, which depends on
the monitoring effort of the supervising institution. For now we take this monitoring effort as
given. In case of detection, we simply assume that the entrepreneur loses everything, i.e. the
entire capital of the firm is confiscated as punishment. The profit of a (risk-neutral)
entrepreneur in the shadow economy is then given by  k v SE − ⋅ µ − = π ) 1 (.   
In order to have a meaningful analysis of the shadow economy, we restrict our








where v* is defined by (1).
12  This condition is satisfied if the probability of detection µ is not
too high.  
When entrepreneurs make their entry decisions, they choose the sector that yields the
highest expected profit ( OE π ,  SE π , 0). For a given bribery demand m, the corrupt official
faces the following entry configuration:
                                                     
11 According to Rose-Ackermann (1997), “going underground is a substitute for bribery.”
12 If the presence of the shadow economy does not constrain the corrupt official’s maximization problem, the
marginal type of entrepreneurs is given by v* as defined by (1).  The marginal type v* earns zero profit when he
enters the official economy.   If he enters the shadow economy instead, he will earn (1-µ) v *-k.   If
* ) 1 /( v k < µ − , the payoff from entering the shadow economy exceeds the payoffs from other options.  Thus,




















The corrupt official takes into account that potential entrants may evade his bribery demands















Once again, we treat the marginal entrant type  µ = / m v  as the control variable:
) ( ) (
~
max v F v v R
v
⋅ ⋅ µ = .
The first order condition 
0 ) ( ' ) ( = ⋅ + v F v v F .( 5 )
determines the marginal type of entrepreneur v ~  entering the official economy when operating
in the shadow economy is the outside option.
13  Entrepreneurs with low abilities
( ) 1 /( µ − < k v ) stay out of business [see Figure 1].  Those with intermediate abilities
( v v k ~ ) 1 /( < ≤ µ − ) operate in the shadow economy.  High-ability entrepreneurs ( v v ≤ ~ ) enter
the official economy and make their contributions to the corrupt official.
The most interesting question here is how the existence of the unofficial sector
influences the behavior of the corrupt official.  There is a clear-cut answer to this question:
Proposition 1. In an economy with corruption, the official sector is larger when production in
the unofficial sector is feasible, i.e.  * ~ v v < .  Thus, the activities in the shadow economy are
complementary to the ones in the formal economy.  
Proof. Evaluate (5) at v*, which is the marginal type of entrepreneur when no unofficial
sector exists:  0 *) ( ' *) ( ' * *) ( < ⋅ = ⋅ + v F k v F v v F  [cf. (1)] and we have  0 / *) ( < ∂ ∂ v v R .
Hence, * ~ v v < . 
                                                     






shadow economy no entry official economy
v ~
Figure 1.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is that social welfare is improved in the
presence of the shadow economy.  There are two channels through which social welfare
increases.   First, the economy benefits directly from the unofficial sector because it allows
entrepreneurs to produce who otherwise would not have entered at all.  The direct benefits
from the shadow economy are given by ∫ µ − −
v
k x dF k x
~
) 1 /( ) ( ) ( .  Second, there are indirect
benefits due to the existence of the shadow economy.  Since it improves the outside option for
entrepreneurs, the corrupt official is forced to lower his bribery demands, which leads to more
entry into the official sector.  This endogeneity of the official’s bribery demand is crucial in
understanding the complementarity between the shadow economy and the official sector.
14
As the bribery payment is a mere redistribution from the entrepreneurs to the corrupt official,
any additional activity is beneficial.  The indirect benefits can be represented by
∫ −
*
~ ) ( ) (
v
v x dF k x .  Thus from a welfare point of view, the existence of the unofficial sector is
desirable.  
This result is in sharp contrast to the negative views of the shadow economy portrayed
by Johnson, Kaufman, and Shleifer (1997), Levenson and Maloney (1996), and Loayza
(1996) among others.  In their models, the government imposes taxes on the official sector
and the tax revenues collected provide public goods that increase the productivity of firms in
the economy.  Thus, the movement of production into the shadow economy has harmful
consequences for the economy since firms in the shadow economy escape taxation and
consequently the ability of the government to provide public goods.
15
                                                     
14 If the official demanded the same bribery demand as in the absence of the shadow economy, then the official
sector would shrink since the marginal type v* would prefer to enter the shadow economy.
15 In section 4, we consider the public finance aspects of the shadow economy as in Johnson et al (1997).10
3. Endogenous Investment and Monitoring 
So far the entrepreneurs’ only choice was which sector to enter. The capital stock only played
a role in deciding whether to enter the market at all. However, there are significant differences
in the firms’ capital stock between the official economy and the shadow economy. We will
incorporate this aspect now by endogenizing the choice on the amount of capital employed in
a firm. 
In order to avoid being detected, firms in the shadow economy typically scale down
the size their operations.  This incentive to avoid detection thus prevents firms in the shadow
economy from achieving economies of scale.  To accommodate the phenomenon of size
dualism observed in the empirical literature on the shadow economy [Banerjee, 1983], we
modify our basic model in two aspects.
16  First, revenues are correlated positively with the
capital stock. Second, the detection probability for illegal firms increases in the size of
investment since larger and more capital-intensive firms are easier to detect.
Let the entrepreneur’s net income in the official sector now be  k v k k v ⋅ − = − ⋅ ) 1 (
with ] , 0 [ K k∈ .
17  The larger the capital stock and the higher the ability, the more revenue can
be generated by an entrepreneur. Without corruption, the optimal decision of an entrepreneur
is to enter the market and employ the maximum amount of capital K if his ability v exceeds
unity ( 1 ≥ v ).  Entrepreneurs with lower ability ( 1 < v ) do not enter the market.  This is not
only the privately optimal entry configuration but also the first best solution for this economy.
As in the previous section, consider first the case where the option to operate in the
shadow economy is not available.  Given the official’s demands m for the license, the
marginal type who is indifferent between entry and exit is given by  0 ) 1 ( = − − m K v , that is,
1 / + = K m v . The entry behavior of the entrepreneurs implies that the corrupt official
maximizes his revenue:
                                                     
16 Rauch (1991) defines size dualism as the existence of a difference in size between the smallest formal sector
firm and the largest informal sector firm.
17 We need to impose an upper bound K on the level of capital employment since we assume a linear production
technology in k.  If we instead assume that the entrepreneur’s revenue in the official sector is concave in k, that
is, vg(k),where g′>0 and g′′<0, we will always have an interior solution and can dispense with the assumption of






 + ⋅ = 1 ) ( max
K
m
F m m R
m
.
Since the official’s demand schedule m is uniquely determined by v, we treat v as the control
variable:
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( max v F v K v R
v
⋅ − = .
The marginal entrant  * v  that maximizes the corrupt official’s revenue is implicitly given by
the first order condition:
0 *) ( ' ) 1 * ( *) ( = ⋅ − + v F v v F . (6)
The number of entrants is given by  *) (v F . The official demands  K v m ) 1 * ( * − =  for the
license.  Since  ) (v F is the inverse cumulative distribution function and  ) ( ' v F ≤0, the first
order condition (6) implies that v>1.   Thus, in our extended model with endogeneous
investment, corruption induces exit of entrepreneurs whose types belong to [
FB v = 1,  * v ).
In the presence of the shadow economy, assume further that the probability of
detection for an entrepreneur is  k ⋅ µ  where µ again measures the monitoring effort of the
supervising institution. The detection probability now also depends on the employed capital k,
the idea being that the detection probability rises with the size of the undertaking as it
becomes more and more difficult to hide the entrepreneurial activity from the supervisor. The
entrepreneur’s profit in the shadow economy is then given by  k k v k SE − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ µ − = π ) 1 (.   A s
the probability of detection depends on the amount of capital employed in a firm, the
entrepreneur who is active in the shadow economy has to trade off the potentially larger profit
from a larger capital stock with the higher risk of detection:
k



















Thus, the optimal level of capital in the shadow economy,  ) ( ˆ v kSE , is inversely related to the
level of monitoring (µ) and positively related to the entrepreneur’s ability (v).  Since there is a12
constraint on the maximum amount of capital (K) that can be employed, the choice of capital





















min ), ( ˆ min
µ
.
Let v ~ again denote the marginal type of entrepreneur who is indifferent between entering the
shadow and the official economy.  Then, we can consider two cases depending on whether the
constraint on the maximum amount of capital (K) is binding or not for the optimal level of
capital employed in the shadow economy (see Figure 2).
Case I:  K v k v k SE SE < = ) ( ˆ ) (
Let us first consider the case where the monitoring effort µ is sufficiently large so that the
capital input in the shadow economy is distorted, i.e.  K v kSE < ) ( ˆ .  The entrepreneur’s profit









) 1 ( 1
2
.
Rather than entering the shadow economy, the entrepreneur has two further options.  First, he
can stay out of business, which earns him zero profits ( 0 0 = π ).  Second, he can enter the
official economy with the maximum firm size K.  The profit earned in the official economy
amounts to  m K v OE − ⋅ − = π ) 1 (.  
Given m, the marginal investor is just indifferent to whether he enters the official
economy or the shadow economy:








= − ⋅ −
4




The corrupt official takes into account that firms might circumvent his discretionary power
over licenses by producing in the shadow economy and maximizes
) (
4
) 1 ( 1























































Then,  v ~ , the marginal type of entrepreneur entering the official economy, is the
solution to  0 /
~
= ∂ ∂ v R .  As in the basic model, entrepreneurs with low abilities ( 1 < v ) do not
enter at all. A second group of entrepreneurs with intermediate abilities ( v v ~ 1 < ≤ ) operates in
the shadow economy and runs inefficiently small firms. Those with high abilities ( v v ≤ ~ )
make the contribution to the corrupt official and operate legally with capital K. 
Case II:  K v kSE = ) (
Suppose now that the capital constraint is binding and at least the marginal type (the highest
type entrepreneur who enters the shadow economy) installs the maximum capital.  The
marginal investor is then given by 






The corrupt official maximizes his revenue
) ( ) ( ) (
~
max
2 v F v K v F v m R
v
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ µ = ⋅ ≡ ,
which yields
0 )] ( ' ) ( [ /
~ 2 = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ µ = ∂ ∂ v F v v F K v R (8)
as the first order condition which implicitly defines the optimal license payment.
Corruption creates incentives for entrepreneurs to run their businesses on an
inefficiently small scale in the shadow economy. Despite this distortion, the message from our
basic model still goes through.
Proposition 2. In an economy with corruption, welfare is higher when production in the
unofficial sector is feasible, even though (at least some) firms in the shadow economy are
inefficiently small. 
                                                     
18 Once again, our assumption that the distribution of entrepreneurs’ types satisfies the monotone hazard rate
condition ensures that the second order condition for the maximization problem is satisfied.14
Proof. (a) Case I: we evaluate (7) at v*, which is the marginal type of entrepreneur when no
unofficial sector exists. The first term in (7) becomes zero [cf. (6)] and we have
0 / *) (
~
< ∂ ∂ v v R . Hence,  * ~ v v < . (b) Case II: Evaluating (8) at v* immediately shows that
. 0 / *) (
~
< ∂ ∂ v v R  Hence,  * ~ v v <  also holds in this case. When production in the shadow
economy is feasible, production in the official sector is larger, i.e.  * ~ v v < , and there is some










Case I    >  µ  µ0











The next proposition shows that the monitoring rate µ decides which case prevails.15
Proposition 3.  There is a critical level of the monitoring rate 
0 µ , such that if 
0 µ > µ  we have
Case I ( K kSE < ), and if 
0 µ ≤ µ  we have Case II ( K kSE = ).  The critical level of monitoring












0 v  is defined by  0 ) ( ' ) (
0 0 0 = ⋅ + v F v v F .
Proof. See the Appendix.
From this point on, we will focus on Case I where  K kSE < , i.e., the optimal capital
choice by entrepreneurs in the shadow economy is inefficiently small, since Case I generates
more interesting and realistic results relevant to the shadow economy.  In addition, if we
dispensed with the assumption of the upper bound on the capital level and instead assumed
that the revenue from employing capital level k is  ) (k g v⋅  with g’(k) > 0 and g’’(k) < 0 for
type v entrepreneurs, we would always have Case I.
The discontinuity in the level of capital employment between the formal and informal
sectors implies that there is firm size dualism in the economy in that the largest informal
sector firm is smaller than the smallest formal sector firm.   Rauch (1991) also derives such
size dualism in his model of self-selection in which labor is divided into formal sector
managers, formal sector employees, informal sector managers, and informal sector
employees.  In Rauch’s model, there is labor market dualism in that a minimum wage that
exceeds the competitive equilibrium wage is enforced only for firms larger than a certain size.
Thus, he assumes a discontinuity in the enforcement activities to generate a discontinuity in
the size distribution of firms.  In our model, we were able to derive the discontinuity in the
size distribution of firms even though the detection probability is continuous in the firm size
represented by k.
 Comparative Statics Results
As market entry is costly due to the existence of corrupt officials, entrepreneurs would like to
flee the official economy. What prevents the entrepreneurs from simply switching to the
informal sector is the threat of detection and punishment. So far the detection probability was
exogenously given. To analyze the consequences of an improvement in the monitoring16
technology on the shadow economy, we parameterize the cost function of monitoring as
) , ( α µ c , where α measures the efficiency of the monitoring technology with  0 / < α ∂ ∂c  and
0 ) /(
2 < α ∂ µ ∂ ∂ c . The official maximizes his revenue net of the monitoring costs 
) , ( ) (
~ ~
max
, α µ − ≡
µ c v R P
v
.
In Case I of the previous analysis
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µ ∂ ∂ ∂ − µ ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ = v P P v P H is the determinant of the Hessian matrix with











α ∂ µ ∂
∂
− =
α ∂ µ ∂
∂ c P








                                                     
19 The analysis for Case II is straightforward.17
Therefore, we can sign the expressions above:
0





















































Proposition 4. An increase in the efficiency of the monitoring technology (α↑) induces a
higher rate of monitoring/detection by the official (µ↑). The better control over entrepreneurs
allows the corrupt official to charge a higher bribery payment m. This drives additional
entrepreneurs into the shadow economy, and the number of firms in the official economy
shrinks (v↑).
20
The prevalence of the shadow economy is often associated with lax enforcement by the
government.  Proposition 4, however, demonstrates that the relationship between the size of
the shadow economy and the monitoring efforts is more complex than it appears.  Given the
level of corruption (represented by m), an increase in the efficiency of the monitoring
technology induces more monitoring efforts and consequently makes participation in the
shadow economy relatively less attractive compared to participation in the official economy.
The level of corruption by the official, however, is an endogenous variable that depends on
the efficiency of the monitoring technology.   With more efficient monitoring technology, the
official is less worried about the possibility of defection to the shadow economy and is able to
charge a higher license fee for entry.   
According to Proposition 4, the direct effect of an increase in the efficiency of the
monitoring technology is dominated by the indirect effect through m.  Thus, the size of the
official economy paradoxically shrinks as a result of more efficient monitoring technology.
The overall effects of a more efficient monitoring technology on the size of the shadow
economy are less clear.  The reason is that even though the number of entrepreneurs in the
                                                     
20 The comparative statics were carried out for Case I. For Case II, the only difference is that the size of the
official economy remains constant when the monitoring technology improves (dv/da=0).18
shadow economy increases, they now operate on smaller scales than before.  It is possible that
overall outputs in the shadow economy are reduced even though more entrepreneurs are in the
unofficial sector.   This implies that we might obtain different answers to the size of the
unofficial economy depending on how we measure the unofficial sector. 
4. Public Goods
Most models analyzing corruption simply assume the existence of corrupt officials having
discretionary power over the entry of firms.
21 In the background, however, there must be
some useful (but not explicitly modeled) purpose for the existence of the public officials.
Otherwise, the simple solution to the corruption problem would be to deregulate the economy,
to abolish licenses and to get rid of the potentially corrupt officials. Hence, there must be
some kind of market failure in the first place that is corrected by imposing regulations,
installing a bureaucracy and requiring licenses for firms. 
We consider now an extension of our basic model where the public official not only
issues licenses but also provides a public good that is used in production. In this case, an
increase in the shadow economy may lead to decreased state revenue, which in turn may
reduce the quality and quantity of public good that enhances the productivity of entrepreneurs.
For simplicity of the analysis, we assume that the required capital for entry k is fixed as in
section 2. Let θ measure the amount of public good that is provided at cost  ) (θ C [with
0 ) ( " , 0 ) ( ' > θ > θ C C ] by the official. The public good enters positively into the production;
the productivity of an entrepreneur of type v is  v ⋅ θ .
Corruption without the Shadow Economy
What are the incentives of a corrupt official to provide the public good? To answer this
question, we start with the scenario where firms face a corrupt official but do not have the
opportunity to escape into the shadow economy. Hence, the entrepreneurs’ only decision is
whether to enter or not. Entry requires the bribery payment m to the corrupt official and the
fixed investment k. Entrepreneurs with non-negative net revenues enter the market:
                                                     
21 An exception is Acemoglu and Verdier (2000).19
0 ≥ − − ⋅ θ k m v . Given the entry decision of firms, the official uses the bribery demand and
the provision of the public good to maximize his revenues:
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) ( ) ( ) ( max
, θ − ⋅ − ⋅ θ ≡
θ C v F k v R
v .
The first order conditions
0 ) ( ' ) ( ) ( = ⋅ − ⋅ θ + ⋅ θ =
∂
∂




0 ) ( ' ) ( = θ − ⋅ =
θ ∂
∂
C v F v
R
(10)
determine entry  * v  and the amount of the public good  * θ .
Proposition 5. Given the number of entrepreneurs  *) (v F , the level of public good provision
is sub-optimally low.
Proof. Given the number of entrepreneurs *) (v F , i.e. all entrepreneurs of type  * v v ≥
entering, the optimal provision of the public good can be found by solving 
) ( ) ( ' max
*
θ − ⋅ ⋅ θ −∫
∞
θ C dv v F v
v
.
The first order condition
0 ) ( ' ) ( '
*




C dv v F v
determines the socially optimal level of the public good 
opt θ  (Samuelson rule). Integration by
parts of the first term on the left hand side shows  *) ( * ) ( '
* v F v dv v F v
v ⋅ ≥ ⋅ −∫
∞
. As we have
*) ( ' *) ( * θ = ⋅ c v F v  from (10), marginal benefits and marginal costs of the public good when
provided by the corrupt official are below the socially optimal level:  *) ( ' ) ( ' θ ≥ θ C C
opt .
Therefore, the level of public good provision is sub-optimally low:  * θ ≥ θ
opt .
The intuition for this result is the following. The choice of  * θ  by the corrupt official is
determined by the marginal type v*. An increase in the benefit of the marginal entrant is
captured via higher bribery demands m by the corrupt official. The effect on the inframarginal
entrants is irrelevant for the official as he cannot price discriminate between firms. In contrast,
                                                     
22 Again, we use v as a control instead of m.20
the second-best level 
opt θ  is determined by the aggregate (or average) benefits for all entrants
with types  ) *, [ ∞ v . As the average type is more productive than the marginal type, the second-
best level for the public good exceeds the level provided by the corrupt official.
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Corruption with the Shadow Economy
When the government provides public goods as an input for firms, the evasion into the
shadow economy comes at a cost for the entrepreneurs. They do not take the risk of detection
and punishment but they also forego some of the benefits created by the public good. We
assume that the entrepreneurs operating in the shadow economy have a productivity of
v ⋅ θ ⋅ α  where α, 1 0 ≤ α ≤ , denotes the extent to which the official can exclude the use of the
public good by those who are in the shadow economy. For instance, α = 1 implies that there is
no exclusion; firms in the shadow economy benefit equally from public goods.  With α = 0,
complete exclusion is feasible and production in the shadow economy becomes impossible.
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Entrepreneurs compare the payoffs from entering the official economy [ k m v − − ⋅ θ ]
or entering the shadow economy [ k v − ⋅ θ ⋅ α ⋅ µ − ) 1 ( ]. Given the entry behavior of firms, the
corrupt official maximizes his revenues:
[] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1
~
max
, θ − ⋅ ⋅ θ ⋅ α ⋅ µ − − ≡
θ
c v F v R
v
.
The first order conditions
0 ) ( ' ) (
~
= ⋅ + =
∂
∂




[] 0 ) ( ' ) ( ) 1 ( 1
~
= θ − ⋅ ⋅ α ⋅ µ − − =
θ ∂
∂
c v F v
R
(12)
again determine entry v ~  and the amount of the public good θ
~
. How does the existence of the
shadow economy as an outside option for entrepreneurs affect the outcome? 
                                                     
23 This point is closely related to a monopolist’s choice on product quality; see Spence (1975) and Tirole (1988,
pp. 100-102).
24 The precise value of α will depend on the type of public goods provided by the government.  If the public
good provided is an infrastructure such as roads and bridges that can be used by everyone, the appropriate value
for α would be 1.  In the case of government loan guarantees and education programs targeted towards registered
firms, the relevant α would be zero.  Law and order correspond to the case where α is somewhere between zero
and one.   A higher level of law and order would contribute to the general business activities in both sectors.
However, entrepreneurs in the unofficial sector would have recourse to the law enforcement agency, say, in the
case of breach of contracts.21
First, the existence of the shadow economy once again induces more entrants.
Evaluating (11) at  * v v =  yields  0 / *) ( ' *) ( ' * *) ( < θ ⋅ = ⋅ + v F k v F v v F  [cf. (9)]. Hence, the
result from our basic model also holds for the scenario with public goods:  * ~ v v < .
Second, the existence of the shadow economy leads to a further underprovision of the
public good. Evaluating (12) at  * v v =  yields  0 ) ( ) 1 ( < ⋅ ⋅ α ⋅ µ − − v F v  and therefore  *
~
θ < θ .
As we already know from Proposition 5, the decision on the public good by a corrupt official
already leads to an underprovision (
opt θ < θ* ). Hence, the existence of the unofficial sector
aggravates the inefficient provision of the public good.
25
Including the provision of public goods explicitly into our model still confirms our
result from the basic model, namely that, in the presence of corruption, the unofficial sector
acts as a complement rather than substitute to the formal economy. The entrepreneurs’
opportunity to move production to the shadow economy mitigates the corrupt official’s
extortive power and leads to more economic activity even in the formal economy. With public
good provision, however, there is also a downside to the leeway created by the shadow
economy. The increased flexibility of entrepreneurs also reduces the incentive for corrupt
officials to provide the public good and leads to a further underprovision relative to the
second-best optimum. 
The empirical results on the shadow economy’s effects on the official economy are
ambiguous.  Some studies show that a growing shadow economy has a negative impact on
official GDP growth whereas other studies show the opposite effect.  The model in this
section may provide a clue to explaining the reason for the ambiguous empirical results
concerning the effect of the shadow economy on the official economy.  
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we develop a simple framework to analyze the links between corruption and the
shadow economy and their implications for the official economy.  In a model of self-selection
with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we show that the entrepreneurs’ option to flee to the
                                                     
25 This result is in line with the findings in the model by Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997).22
underground economy constrains the corrupt official’s ability to introduce distortions to the
economy for private gains.  The unofficial economy thus mitigates government-induced
distortions and as a result, leads to enhanced economic activities in the official sector.  In this
sense, the presence of the unofficial sector acts as a complement to the official economy
rather than a substitute.  This result is in sharp contrast to the existing models of unofficial
economy where the official and unofficial sectors compete for resources and the existence of
the informal sector is viewed as harmful for economic growth [Loayza (1996) and Johnson,
Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997)]. 
The shadow economy is often considered as a debilitating force that saps the official
economy by attracting factors of production away from the official economy and creating
competition for official firms.  As such, most countries attempt to control underground
economic activities through various punitive measures [Schneider and Enste, 2000].
However, when corruption is defined as “the abuse of public power for private benefit” and
the avoidance of it is the raison d’être of the shadow economy, any efforts to eradicate the
shadow economy without tackling the principal problem of corruption would be
counterproductive.   Our model thus suggests the importance of considering the genesis of the
shadow economy to evaluate implications of the shadow economy for resource allocations. 
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Let ν  be defined by
() K
v





















Since  () v kSE  is increasing in v, whether the largest firm in the shadow economy is smaller
than the efficient size () K  and whether there is a discontinuity in the scale of operation
between the formal and informal sectors depends on the relative magnitude of ν  and ν ~ . If
v v < ~ , Case I prevails, i.e.,  () K v kSE < ~ , and if  v v > ~ , Case II prevails, i.e.  () K v kSE = ~ .
Note that in Case II, 
0 ~ v = ν  where 
0 ν  satisfies
( ) ( ) 0
0 0 0 = ′ ⋅ + v F v v F [cf. (7)].
For 
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We also note that the first-order condition (6) for Case I when evaluated at v  becomes after
routine manipulation











0 µ > µ , we have 
0 ) 2 1 ( 1 v K v > ⋅ µ ⋅ − =  since 
0 ν  is independent of µ and determined only
by the distribution F . This implies that24
() () 0
~









Therefore, the optimal marginal type ν ~  that satisfies the first-order condition (6)  0
~
= ∂ ∂ v R  is
lower than ν , that is  () K v kSE < ~  if 
0 µ > µ .25
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